The purpose of history is not to explain the past. It
matters little what the Romans did or did not do. The purpose is to explain the
present.
The key date in European history is 1870. The key
place is Ems. If you understand this you understand everything not so much about
then or there, but about here and now.
Modern European history turns on the German question.
It explains what is happening in Germany, France and the EU generally and it
also explains what just happened in Britain.
Germans have been united and divided for centuries and
it has never been quite clear where Germany was. They were united first into
the Holy Roman Empire. But this loose collection of places that were neither
Holy nor Roman nor an Empire included people who were not Germans and didn’t
unify those Germans that it did include. This was our problem.
Mars-la-Tour, 16 August 1870. Emil Hünten, 1902. |
Napoleon humiliated Prussia at Jena–Auerstedt (1806)
and Austria at Austerlitz (1805). France with the help of many who were not French
became the dominant European power, requiring the combined forces of almost
everyone else to defeat it twice at Leipzig (1814) and Waterloo (1815). France
since then has been trying to relive the glory days rather like Greece has been
trying to relive the days of Alexander and Aristotle. Both have failed.
Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire, but this
just left the question of how Germans could unite again into a second Reich. They
spent until 1870 trying to find a way. Should Germany include all German
peoples (Großdeutschland) or should it leave out Austria (Kleindeutschland). The
problem was that Austria had its own Empire, much of which wasn’t German at all.
How could you include Austria in Germany without splitting up its Empire thereby
turning Austria into Ruritania?
Napoleon really was a second Alexander, but just as
Alexander wasn’t Greek, but rather Macedonian, so too Napoleon wasn’t really French
but rather Italian.
But the French delusion that Napoleon could be
repeated regularly, and that French greatness could return caused it to declare
war on Germany three times in 1870, 1914 and 1939. On each occasion disaster
and humiliation was repeated rather than the reincarnation of Napoleon.
The causes of the Franco-Prussian war (1870) are among
the most absurd in history. An argument over who should be King of Spain and a
perceived insult to the French at Bad Ems turned out very badly indeed for
France.
Helmuth von Moltke had built on the Prussian reforms
and lessons learned since 1806. He had defeated Denmark and solved the Schleswig-Holstein
Question in 1864 and thereby prepared the ground first for a grudge and second for a defeat of Austria and
Saxony at Königgrätz in 1866. Moltke was efficient. He understood supplies and
he understood strategy. The Prussian army converged at just the right moment trapping
the Austrians in a barely remembered battle involving nearly half a million
men. But the best was yet to come.
The French had learned nothing since 1815 and with red
trousers, arrogance and without a plan took on a Prussian army in the process
of turning itself into Germany. The Germans got behind the French at Mars-La-Tour
and a 30,000 man Prussian corps took on and withstood an 160,000 man French
Army. In perhaps the most heroic act in all military history von Bredow's cavalry brigade charged the whole French army, lost half its strength but triumphed over death itself by sealing the doom of hundreds of times its own number.
Next at Gravelotte (a far bigger battle than Gettysburg) the French army ended up besieged, impotent and divided. The mopping up at Sedan not long after was a mere formality. Napoleon III himself was captured. Later Paris was besieged and experimented with revolutionary communism before the final collapse.
It was as Zola described it La Débâcle. The French should never have started the war in the first place and were outthought and outfought during it. The modern German Army became the greatest force in Europe from 1870 until 1945 and not merely the French, but all of us would suffer the consequences of French folly and ineptitude.
Von Bredow's few suffered 50% casualties, but effectively won the war |
Next at Gravelotte (a far bigger battle than Gettysburg) the French army ended up besieged, impotent and divided. The mopping up at Sedan not long after was a mere formality. Napoleon III himself was captured. Later Paris was besieged and experimented with revolutionary communism before the final collapse.
It was as Zola described it La Débâcle. The French should never have started the war in the first place and were outthought and outfought during it. The modern German Army became the greatest force in Europe from 1870 until 1945 and not merely the French, but all of us would suffer the consequences of French folly and ineptitude.
Since 1870 Germany has been too strong for Europe and
the issue has been how to contain Germany within Europe while preventing it taking
over everywhere. The German population outnumbered anyone else. The German Army
perfected by Moltke with a uniquely effective staff structure and training regime
could not be defeated either by France, Britain or even Russia on its own. A
system of alliances grew up therefore between 1870 and 1914, which turned
European diplomacy into a game of dominoes triggering each other into eventual
mobilisation and war.
But these alliances barely contained a Germany capable
of very nearly defeating Britain France and Russia in both 1914, 1940 and 1941.
Sedan was repeated in 1941 and if anything, 1941 was a worse humiliation than
1870. Only miracles saved Britain and Russia from defeat at Dunkirk and the
gates of Moscow.
It is in this context that we must understand the EU.
German war aims in the Septemberprogramm 1914 were to
create a Mitteleuropa economic association and for buffer states around Germany
to be under German hegemony or sovereignty. In essence therefore Germany won
the First World War. It just took it rather longer than four years. It took two
catastrophic defeats to get there, but in the penalty shoot out the Germans always
win in the end.
Germany’s defeat in 1945 was surely the most decisive
in history. The Allies set out to teach Germany the folly of waging war. Nearly
every city was destroyed. In parts of Germany nearly every woman was raped.
Land that had been German for centuries became Russian or Polish or Czech.
Germany itself was partitioned and occupied for half a century. Yet Germany
triumphed.
How to unite Germany and Austria had baffled Germans
in the nineteenth century but the EU provided the answer. It was Großdeutschland
only a little grosser than anyone thought possible. The EU includes everything “Von
der Maas bis an die Memel” [From the Meuse to the Memel, i.e. from Belgium to
Lithuania]. It includes all of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. It included the Burgundians and for the first time since the days described
in the Nibelungenlied these people would be under German suzerainty. All this
has been achieved not by German force, but by German soft power. Once you are
in “ever closer union” and especially once you are in Euroland there is no
escape.
From the ashes of the 1945 Götterdämmerung, with the
Burgundians of SS Charlemagne (französische Nr. 1) fighting on to the last against the new Atilla, arose a new Reich. “Meine Ehre heißt Treue” [My honour is called loyalty] has
been the German tragic flaw since the Nibelung. It leads to exaggeration. It
leads to the whole flaming roof falling in. It is what has made Germany great,
efficient and wonderful, the peak of European culture, with the best
philosophers, the best composers. But it also has given us something terrible. Something worse than anything else in history.
The EU exists because of the combination of German
greatness, strength and efficiency and French decline and weakness. The French
language declined from literally the Lingua Franca, spoken by Russian nobles in
1812 better than they spoke Russian. French is now a subject that is not worth
studying. It is spoken hardly anywhere you would want to go except perhaps
France. But French pride and nostalgia for what has been lost won’t admit this.
So, the EU remains a Babel using someone else’s language to unite what therefore
cannot be united.
The model of protectionism and living beyond your
means required to protect French inefficiency, plus the need to subsidise the
French unwillingness to work means that both Germany and France get what they
wanted from the EU. France gets German reparations in perpetuity and gets to
take the whole of August off, gets to retire before it has earned its pension
and gets to go on strike endlessly while maintaining a living standard it doesn’t
deserve. But the price is that France remains Vichy. German soft power
dominates it just as hard power dominated it from 1940 to 1944.
The price of the EU is that Europeans no longer give
birth to enough European babies. It is too expensive to give birth. It is too
painful and tiresome, and it stops European women having careers and doing what
they want to do. The European Welfare model plus feminism, plus open borders
and mass migration means that gradually the rather arbitrary continent of
Europe will cease to have any meaning. The planks of the ship Europa will be replaced
until there is no wood from the original left. The EU will welcome this and
celebrate it and commission someone to carve a monument to a diversity that
includes the whole world. For today the EU belongs to us. And tomorrow the
whole world. Or is it the other way around?
There is no European identity and nothing to hold the
EU together but force. It’s not so much a European Army that will do this,
but the realisation that soft power is a far more powerful force than soldiers. This
was the lesson Germany learned in defeat, that the rest of us ignored in
victory.
But the European Union has an incoherent unity. It is
the equivalent of the Holy Roman Empire. Some wit will eventually write that the
EU is neither European nor a Union.
Unfortunately, we await a new EU Götterdämmerung. The
Burgundians are Germans once more, because the whole of Europe has become
German vassals. But the loyalty is thin. Like “lost honor among thieves.” The
EU wants us to give up the “meum-teum sense”. What’s Greek is German, what’s
German is Greek. We are all just Europeans. But they resist paying reparations
to anyone but the French. Greek debts are Greek.
The French will continue to accept the bargain they
made out of necessity. The only French foreign policy goal is to avoid being
invaded for a fourth time. But the French are still French. The once dominant German
language was driven out of Elsaß-Lothringen and Gallicization imposed on the
lands that were lost between 1871 and 1919.
Götterdämmerung [Twilight of the Idols] based on the German ur-myth the Nibelungenlied |
There is no common language that will unite Europe because
the French refuse to allow it. This is the tragic flaw at the heart of “ever
closer union”. But the EU will beat, on boats against the current dreaming of
Charlemagne and hoping that it will be fourth time lucky. But it will be borne back
ceaselessly into the past doomed to repeat one last twilight once again. Let us hope that the end of the EU empire when it comes will be neither like 1806, 1918 nor 1945.
Now do you see why it mattered that just like in 1870 the British could watch from afar and not take part? It's not about 1870. It's about now and the years stretching ahead of us.