In Dostoevsky’s Crime
and Punishment Raskolnikov gets into a discussion with Porfiry, the police
investigator, about an article Raskolnikov wrote for a periodical. Porfiry
notices an interesting point in the article whereby “the extraordinary have the
right to commit all sorts of crimes and in various ways to transgress the law,
because in point of fact they are extraordinary” (p. 259) Raskolnikov qualifies
this statement. He does not think, for instance, that the extraordinary have a
duty to transgress, but that they do have the right to. One way, for instance, that this
transgression might be allowed is “in the event that the fulfilment of his idea
- sometimes perhaps salutary for the whole of mankind - calls for it” (p. 259)
He says, for instance, that if the discoveries of Newton could only come about
because of the deaths of one or even one hundred people, it would be justified
and Newton would have the right to remove those people. It does not follow that
Newton has the right to kill whomsoever he pleases or to steal. Only if these
deaths are for the sake of something great, is it justified. He goes on to list
certain great men like Napoleon who shed innocent blood along the way and,
moreover, in creating new laws transgressed the old ones. From this he develops
the idea that “not only great , but even those who are a tiny bit off the
beaten track - that is, who are a tiny bit capable of saying something new - by their very nature cannot fail to be criminals - more or less to be
sure” (p. 260).
Before looking at this
in greater detail it might be worth pointing out how this is similar to another
story concerning murder. In Fear and Trembling, written by Kierkegaard's
pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, there is a long discussion of Abraham setting
out to murder Isaac. The section, however, that most directly corresponds with
Crime and Punishment is the one with the heading “Is there a teleological
suspension of the ethical?” (p. 54). Kierkegaard describes the ethical as the
universal which applies to everyone at all times. The single individual has his
telos or goal in the universal and has the task to annul his singularity in
order to become the universal. To assert his individuality is to sin and he
must surrender this individuality in order to rest once more in the universal.
Kierkegaard admits the consistency of this view, but recognises that if it is
maintained, then Hegel is right and, moreover, Abraham by being willing to kill
his son Isaac is a murderer. On the other hand, “Faith is namely the paradox
that the single individual is higher than the universal” (p. 55). This means he
can go against the universal morality and Abraham on the basis of being higher
than the universal morality can kill his son. This alternative is literally
against logic. He writes therefore:
“This position cannot be mediated, for all mediation takes place only by
virtue of the universal; it is and remains for all eternity a paradox,
impervious to thought” (p. 56). It is for this reason that he asserts that “The
story of Abraham contains just such a teleological suspension of the ethical”
(p.56). The telos for Abraham, the reason he sets out to murder is “because God
demands proof of his faith; he does it for his own sake so that he can prove
it” (p. 59-60). Abraham because of this telos or goal can teleologically
suspend the commands of universal morality, e.g. the Ten Commandments, and
commit murder with impunity.
Let’s look a little
more closely at the comparison between these texts. For Raskolnikov there does
not seem to be anything particularly paradoxical about Newton committing murder
in order to develop his theories. He would appear to be using some sort of
utilitarian idea that if a greater good emerges from an evil action, then it is
justified. Thus a discovery that will benefit millions is justified by the
deaths of a few. We think this way quite commonly with regard to war. Killing
these innocent Germans is justified by the need to defeat Hitler. However, the
idea of the universal ethical applying to everyone, but that under certain
circumstances an individual may transgress it is clearly similar to the idea
presented in Fear and Trembling. Raskolnikov is suggesting that anyone with
individuality, with the ability to say something new, is something of a
criminal. Kierkegaard is saying something similar with the suggestion that
anyone who wants to be a single individual, who wants to have faith likewise
transgresses against the universal.
Let’s look at these
individuals practically. Raskolnikov is a murderer of a pawnbroker. Is the justification
for this murder the theory that he developed in his article? It’s not clear
that it is, though perhaps the theory contributed to the state of mind, which
led him to murder. He is poor, but thinks that he has the potential to do great
things, if only he had some money to get started. Let’s imagine that he gets away
with the murder and goes on in life to create these great things, a cure for
cancer, a solution to poverty etc., etc. Would the murder that got him started
be justified? Obviously, this depends on whether we are willing to follow the
utilitarian theory of ethics, by which the murder could under certain
circumstances be justified, given that it led to a greater happiness. But what
of the poor pawnbroker? It did not help her happiness. The more deontological
side of ethics cries out that this murder was wrong, that we cannot use people,
that they are not a means to an end. However, and this is the crucial point, all
of this depends on Raskolnikov getting away with it. But this getting away with
it likewise applies to all of the other great men. If Newton needs to kill a
hundred people to develop his theories, but gets caught immediately, upon
killing the first of them, he will straight away be tried, convicted and
imprisoned or executed. The same goes for Napoleon. If he starts a coup and
kills hundreds, all will be well if he wins and becomes the Emperor. But if he
loses, he will be tried as a traitor. It may well be possible for these people
to justify themselves with hindsight. History may judge them kindly. But the
risk for the individual who acts outside the bounds of the law and the ethical
is that history will not be there to judge. These people are not great yet. And
so the law will see no mitigation.
Let’s take Abraham. He
acts because God commands him and to show his faith. He acts for the sake of this
telos or goal, which he takes as being higher than his duty to the ethical, his
duty to Isaac. But just as when Raskolnikov murders for the sake of a higher
goal, we still have to take into account the interests of the pawnbroker, so
there is a danger that in Kierkegaard’s account he forgets to take into account
the interests of Isaac. Abraham wants to fulfil God’s command. He wants to show
his faith. But what of what Isaac wants? Perhaps, Isaac, too, wants to fulfil
God’s command and show his faith.
But again let’s look at
Abraham’s situation practically. What would have happened to Abraham if he had
actually killed Isaac? Let’s imagine that a person today felt that he was
commanded by God to kill his son. What would happen if I took my son to a
mountain and killed him with a knife? When caught by the police, what would
happen if I said God commanded me to do it as a test of faith? I would
immediately be tried for murder and would most certainly be detained in a
prison or in a mental hospital. Abraham, too, would have faced whatever laws
existed when he lived. No doubt, these would have been rather harsh, an eye for
an eye, etc. Abraham is only really justified in two circumstances. Either he
gets away with the murder, no one finds out, or he doesn’t have to commit the
murder, the sheep is provided.
But how does this
affect individuality? Of course, there are genuine moral dilemmas, where
individuals must make up their minds in difficult circumstances. As Sartre asks
somewhere, should I look after my aging grandmother or join the resistance?
There are instances like Napoleon where someone must dare in order to succeed,
where the risk is great and failure may mean death. But these situations are
relatively rare.
What strikes me as odd
in both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky is the idea that it is not possible to
express individuality, to be a single individual with something new to say,
without being a criminal in some way. There are laws that apply to everyone.
But these laws only apply to certain things and to aspects of life that affect
everyone else. There are massive areas of private life which are unconstrained
by law, especially if laws are written such that I have the liberty of a
liberal morality that says so long as I harm no one else I may do as I please.
In such circumstances I can think what I please, write what I please. What need
have I for criminality?
Kierkegaard in Fear and
Trembling is deliberately putting forward an extreme example of faith.
Abraham’s example does transgress the universal. But most faith even if it is
likewise a belief in a paradox and an acceptance of the absurd, need not transgress
universal morality. As a Christian I must believe the paradox, and logical
contradiction of God made man (God and not God) who died but rose again (dead
and not dead), but who left me with an example to imitate and the task to
follow him and live how he lived. Here my faith does not require me to
transgress the universal. Quite the reverse.
There may be a
teleological suspension of the ethical, but as Kierkegaard will develop in
works such as “For Self -Examination” our task is to be doers of the Word,
followers of the Book of James, and that requires no such heroics. And yet the
task is far more difficult than that faced by either Abraham or Raskolnikov. So
difficult indeed that almost no one, except perhaps a saint, is able to do what
is required.
Fyodor Dostoevsky Crime
and Punishment translated by by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, London,
Vintage, c1992
Søren Kierkegaard Fear
and Trembling ; Repetition edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, c1983.
